Codecision Procedure Bias: The European Legislation Game
In: European Journal of Law and Economics, Forthcoming
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In: European Journal of Law and Economics, Forthcoming
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: International review of law and economics, Band 30, Heft 1, S. 86-97
ISSN: 0144-8188
International audience ; This paper develops a regulatory competition model to study whether and how refugee law should be centralized, and what are the consequences for refugees and for host countries. Varying refugee flows across countries lead some destinations to adopt strict measures. The resulting externality leads to a generalized "race to the bottom" of asylum law. Neither fixed nor minimum standard harmonization are found to be in the interest of both host countries. Especially the most popular destinations like EU border countries would suffer from losing discretion. However, minimum standards would benefit refugees and less popular destinations.
BASE
International audience ; This paper develops a regulatory competition model to study whether and how refugee law should be centralized, and what are the consequences for refugees and for host countries. Varying refugee flows across countries lead some destinations to adopt strict measures. The resulting externality leads to a generalized "race to the bottom" of asylum law. Neither fixed nor minimum standard harmonization are found to be in the interest of both host countries. Especially the most popular destinations like EU border countries would suffer from losing discretion. However, minimum standards would benefit refugees and less popular destinations.
BASE